A helpful concept in building an NBA roster is finding value where no one else sees it. There are few players in the league that are going to succeed no matter what the situation is. How a player fits in and can mesh with those around him is an important factor in how one performs.
Los Angeles Clippers general manager and head coach Doc Rivers is hoping his roster fits the talents of Lance Stephenson better than the Charlotte Hornets’ roster did. Rivers dealt Spencer Hawes and Matt Barnes for the mercurial guard in an out of nowhere deal just ten days before the draft. He was able to acquire a vastly talented and versatile, soon to be 25-year-old wing, for a failed free agent signing with a contract running through 2017-2018 (player option) and a limited 35-year-old “three and D” small forward.
The cost wasn’t prohibitive for the Clippers, and Stephenson’s contract limits the risk. After this season Los Angeles can get out of his deal with only $3.5 million counting against the cap for the following year. If it does work out they can keep him for two seasons at $18 million total.
We’re only two years removed from Stephenson being known as one of the up and coming shooting guards in the league. He put up 13.8 points per game on 49% shooting overall and 35% from three, with 7.2 rebounds and 4.6 assists in 35.3 minutes per game in his final season with the Indiana Pacers (2013-2014). His FG% and 3-PT% both trended up from his rookie season to his fourth season before everything came crashing down in Charlotte as a fifth-year pro.
It wasn’t as though the Pacers, with whom “Born Ready” spent those first four years, had great spacing; however, George Hill, Paul George and David West were all capable shooters in some capacity.
The only Hornet who played over 1,000 minutes and shot over 35% from three with over 100 attempts was Marvin Williams. Charlotte ranked 24th in three-point attempt rate and 30th in three-point shooting at .318.
With Kemba Walker dominating the ball — while Al Jefferson, Michael Kidd-Gilchrist and others clogged up the lane — this didn’t allow Stephenson to take advantage of his shot creation skills for both himself and others. This was exemplified by the drop in shots attempted within five feet from 2013-’14 to 2014-’15. During Stephenson’s final season with Indiana, he shot 44% of his attempts in that area at 65.5%, compared to 31% of his attempts at 54.9%
Playing in a lineup surrounded by Chris Paul, J.J. Redick, Blake Griffin and DeAndre Jordan within Rivers’ offensive scheme should get Stephenson back to playing to his strengths and potentially maximize other skills.
Paul, Redick and Griffin help provide the necessary spacing for Stephenson to prosper as a secondary ball handler in pick and rolls, isos and post-ups. He’s also been an extremely effective cutter in his career according to Synergy Sports Technology, scoring 1.37 points per possession in 2013-’14 (8% of his plays) and 1.42 PPP last season (2.6% of his plays). This can be a useful tool, as 7.9% of Barnes’ possessions last year were cuts and he tallied a 1.23 PPP.
Stephenson can also be used as a vehicle to prop up non-Paul lineups. L.A.’s offensive rating dropped by 19.9 points when “CP3” went off the floor last season, and Stephenson is a better offensive initiator than Jamal Crawford or Austin Rivers.
The biggest question (on court) is if Stephenson can find his shot again. It was so miserably bad last season this is a legit concern: He made only 18 threes on 105 attempts. If he can come close to league average, the variety of skills he brings — offensively and defensively — should allow him to flourish.
How Stephenson will work with the Clippers from a chemistry perspective is even more of an unknown than the on court worries. There’s no way for an outsider to project how this aspect will work out, so I have trouble analyzing it. Teams have won big with these type of issues before and there’s no reason they can’t again.
Whether this decision does or doesn’t work out for Rivers next season, there was a logical process behind the move. After a series of puzzling trades and signings in his role as GM, he finally did something he shouldn’t be embarrassed to put his name next to.
All stats in this story are from NBA.com or basketball-reference.com unless otherwise noted.
