The Philadelphia 76ers are not the Houston Astros of the NBA.
The Astros endured a lot of pain in 2014, but their development of young baseball players swiftly bore fruit in a 2015 playoff season. When organizations transparently attempt to scrap everything and start from the bottom, there’s an expectation players will develop — not to the point that a playoff berth is gained, but at least to the extent that one can see meaningful progress.
Does this reality exist for the 76ers at the end of a humbling season?
Hold that thought for a moment.
We’re beginning a series called “April Autopsy.”
We’re going to the medical examiner’s table to see how the various lottery teams “died” in 2016 (or perhaps before 2016 even arrived).
There’s a bit of spirituality at work here — not just science — in that the way a person dies can affect how others feel (and subsequently act). A bad death creates regret, sadness and emptiness. A good death inspires others and spreads beauty into the world. This is how we live on after we die. How we die doesn’t guarantee certain responses from others, but it can certainly play a significant role.
We’re here to evaluate teams and consider if they died a good death or not this season.
Now, back to the show:
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It’s hard to say that the 76ers took substantial forward steps over the past five months. It’s not a verdict on Brett Brown. This is more a verdict on Sam Hinkie and his “process.”
It’s not that Hinkie’s larger idea was flawed, either — the concept of stockpiling assets makes sense. The execution of that concept is what’s at issue. The chief mistake — not a small one — made by Hinkie was taking Joel Embiid in 2014 when it was clear the big man faced an uphill climb due to injuries and and a generally suspect level of durability.
Ever since Greg Oden became a bust due to his own injury problems, every NBA executive should have been aware of the risk involved in taking a big man with any kind of pronounced or steady (or both) injury history. Yet, that didn’t stop Hinkie, and two years later, the refusal to either draft Aaron Gordon or trade Embiid (or the No. 3 overall pick in 2014) leaves a large gap in Philadelphia’s patchwork lineup.
Yes, the Sixers stockpiled picks, but they stockpiled a number of them in the low-post frontcourt (i.e., the 4 and 5 spots, not the 3). They didn’t engineer a swap with other teams to get the kind of balance which would have served this organization well.
In 2015-2016, we saw the price of this lack of foresight.
* The Sixers were basically done, their season over, as soon as they lost at home to Orlando on Nov. 7 (to fall to 0-6).
* Philadelphia — unless it wins in either Toronto or Chicago to close the season — will wind up with only one win against an opponent with a winning record (Portland, on Jan. 16).
* The Sixers played one almost-average (but not quite) month of basketball this season, going 6-9 from Dec. 26 through Jan. 26. Aside from that one cluster of almost-tolerable results, Philadelphia has won just three other games all season.
* The Sixers have won only one game since the All-Star break, only two since Jan. 26. They’ve beaten Brooklyn and Phoenix twice apiece, the Lakers once.
If this is a team which is building for the future, it sure isn’t building very quickly. It also doesn’t seem to have a roster comprised of component parts. Moreover, only one player this season — Nerlens Noel — will wind up starting in at least 55 games.
The Ish Smith boost this team received in the middle of the season gave the Sixers reason to feel they were on the right track. However, the past two months have put an end to the idea that Philadelphia’s about to turn the corner. The Sixers might have to give up two full seasons in order to begin to feel hopeful about the future.
Put an emphasis on the word “begin,” because it seems the Sixers — as an organization — are still at the point wehre they haven’t started anything.
This team did not die a good death in the 2015-2016 season.
